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ness, however convenient and cheap it may be to reorganizers and however
justly disappointing to recalcitrant minorities, who may be trying to force
the majority to buy them out to get rid of them."
Obviously the right of unsecured creditors must be preserved, but must
it be preserved at the expense of a much larger group of also meritorious
parties and can it not be adequately preserved otherwise than in cash after
a forced sale? It is practically impossible for a large corporation to reor-
ganize without bringing in the old stockholders, first, because they control
the technical ability to run the business and second, because they are more
ready to put up the necessary funds in view of their previous investment.
If creditors must be paid in cash, reorganization is unreasonably checked.
Often it occurs that these creditors themselves are at a disadvantage in
forced sales and distribution afterward. Their share of the proceeds may
be, and, in fact, usually is only a fraction of their just claim. On the other
hand, if the reorganized company were allowed to carry on the business,
probably a much higher per cent of their claims would eventually be paid
the unwilling participants.
Even if this were not true, it seems inharmonious with equitable prin-
ciples that the technical rights of a few objectors should preclude a large
majorii of willing participants from a chance to recover their larger
losses. -. hether the obstructive tactics of selfish minorities are less dan-
,erous than the chance of tyranny by the majority has not been decided
by the highest tribunal or by any great weight of authority among lower
courts. It would seem, however, assuming that the reorganization plan
has been approved after deliberation by an accurately informed court, and
a large majority of the interested parties assent, that the courts should
have the power to make the plan binding, even though there is no sale and
no caih is distributed to the dissenters. Upon consideration of the more
recent decisions and dicta, it would seem that there is a trend toward recog-
nizing such power in the courts, even in the absence of legislation.
M. C. M.
E,. DENcE--DYING DECLARATIONS-APPEAL AND ERROR-S. was con-
victed of murdering his wife by poisoning her with bichloride of mercury.
Defendant appealed to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals, con-
tending that a statement of Mrs. S. to her nurse had been erroneously ad-
mitted in evidence as a dying declaration. The statement was, "Dr. Shep-
ard has poisoned me." It was made two days after Mrs. S.'s illness had
begun, at a time when she was greatly improved and was not thought by
her physicians to be dangerously ill. At the trial, the declaration was
offered and received as a dying declaration. The defense had advanced the
theory of suicide, and produced evidence that indicated a suicidal intent on
the part of Mrs. S. The United States Circuit Court of Appeals held that
the statement was not admissible as a dying declaration, but was admis-
sible for the purpose of rebutting the evidence of suicidal intent, and
affirmed the conviction. Defendant brought certiorari to the Supreme
Court of the United States. Held, judgment reversed. Testimony ad-
mitted at the trial for an illegitimate purpose cannot be considered in the
appellate court as if admitted for a different purpose unavowed and unsus-
RECENT CASE NOTES
pected, where the purpose in reserve would be unlikely to occur to unin-
structed jurors.'
The holding that the declaration was not admissible as a dying declara-
tion, since the declarant, at the time of making it, was not shown to have
spoken without hope of recovery and in the shadow of impending death, is
in accord with the Indiana rule on dying declarations. 2 The great weight
of authority in other states also holds that a dying declaration is not ad-
missible as such unless it be shown that declarant was conscious of ap-
proaching death and had no hope of recovery. 3
The unique feature of the principal case is its decision that evidence
admitted for an express purpose cannot be considered on appeal as if ad-
mitted for another purpose, even though no instruction limiting its effect
was asked for at the trial. It is generally held that the trial court is not
required to give instructions as to particular points, in a criminal case,
where no request therefor is made.4 In Indiana and a majority of the other
states, where evidence is admitted in a prosecution against two persons
jointly, but is admissible against only one of them, the other cannot com-
plain that the court did not limit the application of the evidence, where no
such instruction was requested.5 However, none of the cases establishing
this rule presented the question of evidence offered and received for an ex-
press purpose. Justice Cardozo, in the principal case, conceded that if the
purpose of the evidence had been left at large, the rule of the cases cited
above might apply, and defendant, not having asked for an explanatory
instruction, might not be allowed to complain on appeal as to the purpose
for which it was used. But where the testimony was offered for an illegiti-
mate purpose, the court held that the trial would become unfair if testi-
mony thus accepted could be used in the appellate court as if admitted for
a different purpose, unavowed and unsuspected.
In support of this reasoning, the court cited a recent decision of the
New York Court of Appeals, People v. Zackowitz. 6 There it was held that
where the state was erroneously allowed to introduce evidence tending to
show murderous propensities on the part of defendant, the fact that de-
fendant later took the stand, so that this same evidence would be competent
to impeach his credibility, did not cure the error of admitting it.7
The writer was able to find only one other case propounding the doc-
trine of the principal case. In that case, the state moved to strike out
IShepard v. United States (Kan.) (1933), 54 Sup. Ct. 22.
2Williams v. State (1907), 168 Ind. 87, 79 N. E. 1079; Watson v. State (1878),
63 Ind. 548; Morgan v. State (1869), 31 Ind. 193.
'Brennan v. People (1906), 37 Colo. 256, 86 P. 79; Fuqua v. Commonwealth
(1903), 73 S. W. 782; Collins v. People (1902), 194 Ill. 506, 62 N. E. 902; Gardner
v. State (1908), 55 Fla. 25, 45 So. 1028; People v. Brecht (1907), 105 N. Y. S.
436, 120 App. Div. 769.
'Paulson v. State (1903), 118 Wis. 89, 94 N. W. 771; People v. Willett (1895),
105 Mich. 110, 62 N. W. 1115; Mead v. State (1891), 53 N. J. Law 601, 23 A. 264;
Zell v. Commonwealth (1880), 94 Pa. St. 258; Commonwealth v. Selesnick (1930),
272 Mass. 354, 172 N. E. 343.
'Thompson v. State (1920), 189 Ind. 192, 125 N. E. 641; State v. Romeo
(1912), 42 Utah 46, 128 P. 530; State v. Shout (1915), 263 Mo. 360, 172 S. W. 607;
Lytle v. United States, 5 Fed. (2nd) 622.
a254 N. Y. 192, 172 N. E. 466.
7People v. Zackowitz (1930), 254 N. Y. 192, 172 N. E. 466.
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certain evidence. Before granting the motion the court inquired of defend-
ant's counsel as to the purpose of the evidence. It was not admissible for
the purpose named by counsel, and was stricken out. On appeal, defend-
ant's contention that the evidence was offered for a different purpose was
not allowed.8
In the instant case, the court went on to say that aside from the fatal
objection outlined above, this particular declaration would not have been
admissible as evidence of deceased's state of mind, even though it had been
so limited at the trial. This declaration was an accusation of defendant.
It was hearsay evidence of defendant's guilt. As Justice Cardozo put it,
"Other tendency, if it had any, was a filament too fine to be disentangled
by a jury."
The rule of the principal case seems to be a reasonable restriction of the
doctrine that it is never error for the court to fail to limit the evidence to
its legitimate purposes, where an instruction to this effect is not asked.
S. F. S.
PERSONS-HusBAND AND WI--WiFE's RIGHT TO EARNmNGs--Appellant,
the administrator of the estate of Lydia Offenbacker, prosecuted this appeal
from a judgment in favor of appellee, who is the wife of Lydia Offenback-
er's son. For nineteen years prior to her death Mrs. Offenbacker, an in-
valid, lived in the home of her son and appellee and was cared for by them.
For about five years of this period she was confined to her bed by illness
so that she required the exacting and constant attention of her son or
appellee. Mrs. Offenbacker frequently told appellee and her husband that
she expected to compensate them for their services, and after her death,
both filed claims against the estate, which were allowed. Appellant con-
tends that such services as were rendered by appellee belong to her hus-
band, and that when his claim was allowed it necessarily included any sum
earned by appellee. Held, that such earnings were the separate property
of the wife.1
The apparent conflict of Indiana cases arising under the statute which
provides that "the earnings and profits of any married woman, accruing
from her trade, business, services or labor, other than labor for her hus-
band or family, shall be her sole and separate property" 2 is due to the
failure of the court to analyze the fact situation of each individual case.
It has repeatedly been held in this state that services of the wife, unless
performed in her separate business, 3 or for third persons,4 belong to her
husband as at common law.S It is also settled that the husband may give
'Lindsay v. State (1898), 39 Tex. Cr. P. 468, 46 S. W. 1045.
1 Offenbacker v. Offenbacker (1933), 187 N. E. 903 (Ind.).
2 Section 8740, Burns' Ann. St. 1926.
3Wilson v. Wilson (1887), 113 Ind. 415, 15 N. E. 513; Boots v. Griffith (1883).
89 Ind. 246; Wetzel v. Kellar (1894), 12 Ind. App. 75, 39 N. B. 895.
A Kennedy v. Swisher (1905), 34 Ind. App. 676, 73 N. E. 724; Elliott v. Atkin-
son (1910), 45 Ind. App. 290, 90 N. E. 779; Kedey v. Petty (1899), 153 Ind. 179,
54 N. E. 798; Arnold v. Buchanan (1915), 60 Ind. App. 626, 111 N. E. 204; City of
Jacksonville v. Griggs (1924), 82 Ind. App. 104, 144 N. B. 560.
5Baxter v. Pricket's Administrator (1867), 27 Ind. 490; Jenkins v. linn
(1871), 37 Ind. 349; Yopst v. Yopst (1875), 51 Ind. 61; Knppenberg v. Morris
(1881), 80 Ind. 540; Board of Commissioners of Tipton County v. Brown (1891),
